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II. ANTITRUST LAW
Persons Under the Sherman Act: Rex Systems, Inc. v.

Holiday
The Sherman Antitrust Act' (Sherman Act) prohibits persons from
entering contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that restrain trade and

from attempting to monopolize a part of trade. 2 Any person who suffers
business or property injury because of a violation of the antitrust laws may
sue for treble damages and costs.' The Sherman Act defines the term
"person" to include corporations and associations.4 Thus, individuals, cor-

porations, unincorporated associations, labor unions, and cities successfully

have sued or have been subject to suit under the Sherman Act.5 In Rex
Systems, Inc. v. Holiday,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the

of the
Fourth Circuit considered whether agencies or other instrumentalities
7
United States are persons subject to suit under the Sherman Act.
In Rex Systems the plaintiff, Rex Systems, Inc. (Rex), competed for a
series of contracts to manufacture Model APX-72 Identification Friend or

Foe receiver-transmitters (APX-72) for the United States Government. 8 The
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
2. Id. §§ 1-2. Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) specifically
prohibits trusts and any other contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrains trade among
the states or with foreign nations. Id. § 1. Section two of the Sherman Act targets persons
who monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of trade. Id. § 2. Both sections one and
two of the Sherman Act authorize courts to impose maximum fines of $1,000,000.00 against
corporations or $100,000.00 against any other person and maximum prison terms of three
years for violations of the Sherman Act. Id. §§ 1-2.
3. See id. § 15 (providing treble damages remedy for violations of antitrust laws).
Although Congress provided for treble damages in the original Sherman Act, the treble
damages remedy subsequently appeared in the Clayton Act. Id. The Clayton Act provides that
treble damages are available to plaintiffs injured through violations of most of the federal
antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act. See id. § 12(a) (defining term "antitrust laws" in
context of Clayton Act to include Sherman Act, Clayton Act, parts of Wilson Tariff Act, and
Act amending Wilson Tariff Act). Congress enacted the Clayton Act to supplement the
Sherman Act by targeting specific anti-competitive business practices. See 16B J. VON KALINOWsKI, AN=rrrusr LAWS AND TRADE REGuLATION § 11 (1987) (discussing development of
Clayton Act and relation of Clayton Act to other antitrust laws).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
5. See, e.g., City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
395 (1978) (defining term "person" under antitrust laws to include cities); United Mine
Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 392 (1922) (recognizing labor unions as
associations within meaning of Sherman Act); United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743
F.2d 1114, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding corporation liable under Sherman Act for attempted
monopolization), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985); American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers
v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869, 870, 874 (4th Cir. 1950) (holding individual members of tobacco
association guilty of antitrust violations); United States v. Connecticut Package Stores Ass'n,
205 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D.C. Conn. 1962) (holding local package stores association is person
within meaning of Sherman Act).
6. 814 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1987).
7. See Rex Systems, Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d 994, 997 (finding that neither Navy nor
Naval personnel acting in official capacities are amenable to antitrust suits).
8. See id. at 995-96 (noting that Rex competed for four contracts to manufacture APX72's between 1982 and 1985).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:679

government awarded the contracts under a competitive bidding system

(solicitation) established and regulated by the federal government.9 In 1984
the government awarded Rex one of the APX-72 contracts, but later

terminated Rex's contract after determining that Rex had defaulted. 0 Rex
subsequently filed a complaint with the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals and claimed that, to discourage Rex from fulfilling its contractual
obligations, the government withheld necessary information and materials."
Believing that the federal government unfairly had dealt with Rex in several
other solicitations, Rex subsequently brought an antitrust suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the United
States Department of the Navy (Navy), George K. Holiday in his official
capacity as Contracting Officer at the United States Navy Aviation Supply
Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, John F. Lehman, Jr. in his official
capacity as Secretary of the Navy, and Hazeltine Corporation (Hazeltine),
a competing military contractor. 2 Rex claimed that the government's conduct demonstrated a conspiracy to create and maintain a monopoly for
Hazeltine in the APX-72 market. 3 Rex requested a declaratory judgment

9. See id. (noting that in awarding contracts for APX-72's, Navy employed federal
statutory solicitation process). The requirements that heads of government agencies must fulfill
in procuring property and services for the United States Armed Forces appear in the federal
procurement laws. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304-2305 (1982). The federal procurement laws provide that
whenever possible, heads of government agencies must follow procedures that encourage open
competition for defense contracts. Id. The federal procurement laws further require heads of
agencies to solicit sealed bids whenever appropriate. Id.
10. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 996. In Rex Systems, the 1984 contract between Rex and
the Navy required the Navy to provide Rex with technical drawings and specifications by
contractually specified dates. Brief for Appellant at 6, Rex Systems, Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d
994 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-1008) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. Shortly after the Navy
awarded the 1984 contract to Rex, a dispute over what particular models the contract required
the Navy to provide arose between Rex and the Navy. Id. When Rex refused to proceed until
the Navy provided accurate models, the Navy determined that Rex had defaulted and, therefore,
terminated Rex's contract. Id. at 8.
11. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 996. In Rex Systems, Rex regarded the government's
termination of Rex's contract to manufacture APX-72's as a breach of contract by the Navy
and, therefore, filed a complaint with the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Id; see
41 U.S.C. § 607 (1982) (enabling executive agencies to establish agency boards to hear contract
disputes). Although Rex believed that the government had dealt unfairly in each of the
solicitations in which Rex had competed, Rex determined that the difficulty of obtaining
evidence of governmental misconduct would preclude Rex from individually challenging each
solicitation. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 996. Rex, therefore, filed a complaint with the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals only with respect to the government's conduct during the
1984 solicitation. Id.
12. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 995.
13. Id. at 996. In Rex Systems Rex based its antitrust claim on the Navy's conduct
during four solicitations, the first two of which occurred in 1982. Id. Rex alleged, first, that
during the first solicitation, the Navy permitted Hazeltine to underbid Rex by allowing Hazeltine
to alter certain line items on its sealed bid after submitting the bid to the Navy. Appellant's
Brief, supra note 10, at 4. Rex alleged, second, that during the second solicitation, the Navy
wrongfully failed to grant a delay in the opening of bids. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 996. After
the third solicitation in 1984, however, the Navy awarded Rex the contract, but, according to
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that the defendants had conspired to violate the antitrust and procurement
laws, an award of treble damages, and an injunction prohibiting the
14
defendants from future violations of the antitrust and procurement laws.
At trial the Navy successfully moved for summary judgment against
Rex's antitrust claims. 15 The district court determined that the Navy is not
a person amenable to suit under the antitrust laws.' 6 The district court also
held that individuals acting in official capacities are not persons within the
meaning of the antitrust laws and, therefore, dismissed Rex's antitrust
claims against Contracting Officer Holiday and Secretary Lehman.17 The
district court held, further, that Rex should submit any further claims
concerning the solicitation process to the United States Claims Court or the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. 18 Rex appealed the district
court's rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.1 9
On appeal Rex argued that the Navy and Naval personnel acting in
official capacities properly could be defendants in an antitrust suit. 20 Rex
relied primarily on a similar antitrust action in which the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina held that if the plaintiffs
could show that the Secretary of Agriculture acted beyond the scope of his
statutory authority, the plaintiffs could sue the Secretary of Agriculture in
his official capacity for injunctive relief under the antitrust laws. 2' Rex
contended, therefore, that sovereign immunity does not protect government
officials who have acted outside the scope of their statutory authority. 22

Rex, wrongfully terminated the contract in 1985. Id.; see supra note 10 and accompanying
text (discussing Rex's dispute with Navy over 1984 contract). Rex alleged, finally, that during
a fourth solicitation in 1985, the government wrongfully disclosed Rex's bid to Hazeltine. Rex
Systems, 814 F.2d at 996.
14. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 996.
15. Id.
16. See id. (noting district court's determination that United States Navy is not person
within meaning of Sherman Act); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982) (prohibiting conduct in
restraint of trade or in an attempt to monopolize part of trade by persons and allowing
persons to recover treble damages); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing prohibitions under Sherman Act).
17. See Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 996 (noting district court's determination that individuals
acting in official, governmental capacities are not persons within meaning of Sherman Act).
18. See id (noting district court's instruction that Rex should submit claims concerning
solicitation process to United States Claims Court or Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals).
19. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 996.
20. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 10, at 13-15 (arguing that district court improperly
dismissed Rex's antitrust claim against Navy, Contracting Officer Holiday, and Secretary
Lehman).
21. See id. at 14 (arguing that courts may enjoin federal officials from engaging in anticompetitive conduct that falls outside officials' statutory authority); Windham v. American
Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641, 646 (D.S.C. 1975) (noting that sovereign immunity protects
federal officials only if officials' conduct does not conflict with statutory authority), rev'd on
other grounds, 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976); see also infra notes 37-45 (discussing Windham).
22. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 10, at 15 (claiming that violations of antitrust
laws clearly were outside scope of authority of Contracting Officer Holiday and Secretary

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:679

The Fourth Circuit in Rex Systems, affirmed, however, the district
court's dismissal of Rex's claims against Contracting Officer Holiday,
Secretary Lehman, and the Navy. 23 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that agencies
and other instrumentalities of the United States are not persons subject to
suit under the Sherman Act.Y The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that
Congress has not provided any guidance on whether agencies and instrumentalities of the United States are persons amenable to suit under the
Sherman Act. 25 In ruling that the Navy and Naval personnel are not persons
under the Sherman Act, the Fourth Circuit relied, therefore, on recent
circuit court opinions. 26 In holding that the Navy and Navy personnel are
not persons under the Sherman Act, the Fourth Circuit in Rex Systems
primarily focused on Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Alaska Railroad2 7 in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that agencies
and instrumentalities of the United States are not persons amenable to suit

under the Sherman Act. 28 Persuaded by the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in SeaLand, the Fourth Circuit simply applied the D.C. Circuit's reasoning to the
facts of Rex Systems.29 In Sea-Land the D.C. Circuit ruled that the plaintiff
corporation could not sue the Alaska Railroad, a utility owned and operated
by the United States.3 0 The D.C. Circuit relied on the United States Supreme

Lehman); see also infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing Rex's claim that United
States Supreme Court has approved antitrust suits against United States government and
agencies).
23. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 998.
24. Id. at 997.
25. Id.
26. See id. (citing other circuit court opinions that rule on whether agencies or instrumentalities of United States are persons under antitrust laws); see also Sakamoto v. Duty-Free
Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding government of Guam is not
amenable to antitrust suits), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986); Department of Water and
Power v. Bonneville Power Admin., 759 F.2d 684, 693 n.12 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that agency
within Department of Energy is not subject to antitrust laws); Tele-Communications of Key
West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding United States Air
Force not subject to suit under Sherman Act); Greenwood Utils. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power
Co. 751 F.2d 1484, 1504 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding division of Department of Energy is not
liable under Sherman Act); Jet Courier Servs., Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 713 F.2d 1221,
1228 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that Federal Reserve System is not amenable to suit under
Sherman Act); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding Alaska Railroad, wholly owned and operated by United States, not subject to suit
under Sherman Act), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982).
27. 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982).
28. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska Railroad, 659 F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982).
29. See Rex Systems, Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d 994, 997 (4th Cir. 1987) (relying heavily
on reasoning of D.C. Circuit).
30. See Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 247 (holding that Alaska Railroad is not amenable to suit
under antitrust laws). In Sea-Land the plaintiff corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
alleged that the Alaska Railroad, an entity of the United States government, conspired with a
private corporation to drive out competition and to monopolize the Alaska shipping trade. Id.
at 244. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that sovereign
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Court's holding in United States v. Cooper Corporation3 that the United
States is not a person entitled to sue for treble damages under the Sherman
Act.32 The Sea-Land court recognized the Supreme Court's reasoning that
if the United States were a person entitled to bring an antitrust action, the
United States, similarly, would be a person subject to suit as an antitrust
defendant. 33 The D.C. Circuit recognized, further, that Congress reacted to
the Cooper decision by amending the antitrust laws in 1955 to allow the
United States to sue for actual, rather than treble, damages.3 4 The SeaLand court noted, however, that the 1955 amendments to the antitrust laws
did not declare the United States a person under the Sherman Act or make
the United States a potential antitrust defendant. 35 The D.C. Circuit in Sea-

immunity barred the suit against the Alaska Railroad and the officials responsible for the
railroad's operation. See id. (noting district court's holding in Sea-land). The plaintiff corporation appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Id. The D.C.
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, but for different reasons. Id.; see infra notes
64-68 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. Circuit's reasons in Sea-Land for affirming
district court's dismissal).
31. 312 U.S. 600 (1940).
32. See Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 245 (noting that only persons may sue or be subject to
suit under Sherman Act); see also United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 614 (1940)
(refusing to include United States among persons who are amenable to suit under Sherman
Act). In Cooper the United States claimed that the Cooper Corporation had conspired to fix
prices of goods purchased by the United States. Id. at 603-04. The United States sought to
recover treble damages under the antitrust laws. Id at 604. In holding that the United States
is not a person within the meaning of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court affirmed both
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. at 614. The Cooper majority noted that although
the United States is a person for purposes of bringing contract suits and suits to defend
government property, the Sherman Act creates special rights and remedies available only to
those plaintiffs on whom the Act confers them. Id at 604. The Supreme Court analyzed
judicial decisions, legislative history and supplemental legislation and determined that Congress
did not intend to give the United States a civil action for damages under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 606-14.
33. See Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 245 (noting Supreme Court's refusal to allow United
States to become potential antitrust defendant); see also Cooper, 312 U.S. at 606 (recognizing
that by declaring United States a person under Sherman Act, Supreme Court would subject
United States to potential antitrust liability).
34. See Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 245 (noting that Congress amended antitrust laws in 1955
to remedy Supreme Court decision in Cooper); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (amending
Clayton Act). In 1955 Congress amended the Clayton Act to authorize the United States to
recover damages for governmental business or property injury resulting from violations of the
antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). The provisions of the 1955 amendment to the Clayton
Act are similar to the provisions of the private right of action under the Sherman Act except
that the United States may recover only actual damages and the cost of suit. Id.; see 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (private right of action allowing treble damages to persons suffering injury
from violations of antitrust laws).
35. See Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 245 (noting narrow implications of 1955 amendments to
Clayton Act). Relying on the legislative history of the 1955 amendments to the Clayton Act,
the D.C. Circuit in Sea-Land explained that Congress was aware of the Supreme Court's view
that the United States was not a person under the Sherman Act. Id. at 245 n.4; see 101 CONG.
REc. 5129 (1955) (Remarks of Rep. Celler) (recognizing Supreme Court's determination in
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Land declined, therefore, to subject an entity of the United States govern36
ment to liability under the Sherman Act.
Although the Fourth Circuit relied exclusively on Sea-Land, Rex argued
that the Fourth Circuit should apply Windham v. American Brands, Inc. ,3
in which the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
held that plaintiffs may sue government officials who have acted outside
the scope of their statutory authority.3 8 The plaintiff in Windham moved
for class certification against corporate defendants and the Secretary of
Agriculture. 39 The plaintiff alleged that the corporate defendants, with the
knowledge and consent of the Secretary of Agriculture, conspired in violation of the Sherman Act to fix and control prices and to monopolize the
warehouse auction markets for flue-cured tobacco. 4° The plaintiffs alleged,
further, that the corporate defendants and the Secretary of Agriculture
conspired to control the amount of flue-cured tobacco that producers could
sell per day or per week and to control the availability of inspectors to the
different marketing areas. 41 The Secretary of Agriculture moved for either
dismissal or summary judgment.4 2 The Secretary of Agriculture contended
that the complaint failed to state a claim on which the court could grant
relief, that, as Secretary, he acted in accordance with statutory authority,
and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an uncontested action against
a federal officer who enjoyed the protection of sovereign immunity. 43 The
Windham court, however, denied the Secretary's motion for dismissal on
grounds of sovereign immunity.44 The court held that an antitrust violation,
if proved, would fall outside the scope of the Secretary's statutory authority
and, therefore, the court denied the Secretary the protection of sovereign
45
immunity.
Cooper that United States is not a person under Sherman Act). The D.C. Circuit in Sea-Land
emphasized, however, that Congress intentionally addressed only the Cooper Court's direct
holding that the United States could not sue for treble damages under the Sherman Act. SeaLand, 814 F.2d at 245 n.4.; see also Cooper, 312 U.S. at 614 (holding United States not
entitled to sue under Sherman Act). The D.C. Circuit observed, therefore, that without
addressing the status of the United States as a person under the Sherman Act, Congress simply
amended the antitrust laws to provide the United States a right of action for damages. SeaLand, 659 F.2d at 245.

36. See Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 247 (refusing to subject United States to liability for
violations of Sherman Act).
37. 68 F.R.D. 641 (D.S.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976).
38. See Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641 (D.S.C. 1975) (noting that
government official must act within valid statutory authority to claim sovereign immunity),
rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976); Appellant's Brief, supra note 10, at
14 (arguing that Windham supports antitrust liability for government officials who act outside
of statutory authority).
39. Windham, 68 F.R.D. at 644.
40. Id.at 644-45.
41. Id.at 645.
42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id.at 647.
45. Id.
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The Windham court based its refusal to grant the Secretary of Agriculture's motion for dismissal on the opinion of the United States Supreme
46
Court in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation.
In Larson
the Supreme Court considered whether, by claiming sovereign immunity, an
officer of the War Assets Administration, an entity of the federal government, could bar a suit for injunctive relief in a contract dispute. 47 The

Larson Court recognized that courts might impose liability for damages on

a government officer for his personal actions. 48 The Larson Court held,

however, that unless the officer's personal actions conflicted with statutory

authority, the officer's actions were actions of the sovereign and, consequently, not subject to injunction or court direction. 49 The Supreme Court
emphasized, further, that provided the power to make a decision to act is
within an officer's statutory authority, actions of a government officer that
are based on incorrect interpretations of law or fact do not necessarily fall
outside of the officer's statutory authority. 50 The Supreme Court in Larson
declined, therefore, to eliminate sovereign immunity in every case in which
a plaintiff can show that a government official acted wrongfully.5' The
Supreme Court expressly noted that regardless of an official's improprieties,
an injunction prohibiting a federal official from engaging in particular
conduct constitutes an illegal attempt to enjoin the sovereign unless the
46. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
47. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 684 (1949). In Larson
the plaintiff, a private corporation, alleged that the War Assets Administration sold surplus
coal to the plaintiff but later refused to deliver the coal and contracted to sell the coal to
another party. Id. The plaintiff sued Larson in his official capacity as administrator of the
War Assets Administration. Id. The plaintiff sought both an injunction that would prohibit
Larson from selling or delivering the coal to anyone except the plaintiff and a declaration that
the sale to the second party was invalid. Id. The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia granted, however, Larson's motion to dismiss. See id. at 684-85 (noting that
district court dismissed suit against government official). The district court reasoned that
sovereign immunity barred the suit. Id. The plaintiff, however, appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. v. Littlejohn,
165 F.2d 235, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The Court of Appeals held that the court's jurisdiction
depended on whether title to the coal had passed and, consequently, reversed the district court.
Id. at 238. The defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Larson, 337 U.S. at
685. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether plaintiffs generally could obtain
injunctive relief that compels or restrains the conduct of a government official. Id. at 688.
48. See Larson, 337 U.S. at 687 (noting that plaintiffs may recover damages for
government officer's personal actions). The Supreme Court in Larson observed that the crucial
question in determining whether sovereign immunity bars a suit against a federal official is
whether the relief sought affected only the federal officer or the officer and the federal
government. Id. The Larson Court held that sovereign immunity did not bar an action that
neither compelled the government to act in a certain manner nor disturbed the government's
property. Id.
49. See id. at 688 (holding that suits restraining conduct of government officer constitute
illegal suits against government).
50. See id. at 695 (holding that mere allegation of tortious conduct by government officer
is insufficient to show that officer acted beyond delegated authority).
51. See id. at 693 (noting that mere wrongful act is not necessarily contrary to federal
official's statutory authority).
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plaintiff can show that the official acted outside of statutory authority. 2
The Windham court incorrectly read Larson out of context and, therefore, provided an unsound basis for Rex's attempt to obtain injunctive
relief against Secretary Lehman, Contracting Officer Holiday, and the
Navy.. 3 The Windham court failed to distinguish mere wrongful acts from
acts outside of an official's statutory authority.5 4 The facts of Rex, however,
demonstrate that both Contracting Officer Holiday and Secretary Lehman
had statutory authority to make decisions regarding the solicitation process
and, therefore, did not act outside of their statutory authority.5 5 According
to the Larson analysis, therefore, if the actions of Contracting Officer
Holiday and Secretary Lehman were within their statutory authority, their
actions constituted actions of the sovereign that no court could enjoin even
if the actions were wrongful to Rex.5 6 The Supreme Court's opinion in
Larson limits Rex's recourse against Contracting Officer Holiday and Secretary Lehman for antitrust violations to damages that Rex may have been

52. See id. at 701-02 (noting limited circumstances under which Plaintiff may sue to
restrain conduct of federal official). In Larson the Supreme Court stated that in addition to
cases in which a government official has acted beyond the scope of statutory authority, if a
court finds that a federal official's conduct was unconstitutional, the court may restrain the
official's conduct. Id.
53. See Windham v. American Brands, Inc. 68 F.R.D. 641, 646 (D.S.C. 1975) (noting
that doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect federal officer whose conduct conflicts
with statutory authority), rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976). In Windham
the court cited the Supreme Court's language in Larson but failed to address the Supreme
Court's distinction between wrongful acts and acts that are outside of an official's statutory
authority. Id.; see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949)
(distinguishing wrongful acts from acts outside of federal officer's statutory authority). The
Supreme Court in Larson emphasized that conduct does not fall outside of a federal officials
statutory authority merely because the official makes an incorrect decision of law or fact.
Larson, 337 U.S. at 695. The Larson Court's reasoning, therefore, contradicts the Windham
court's conclusion that a routine decision by the Secretary of Agriculture falls outside of the
Secretary's statutory authority simply because the decision violates the antitrust laws. See id.
(holding that courts may not enjoin or direct actions within federal officer's statutory authority);
Windham, 68 F.R.D. at 647 (holding that participation in antitrust violation is necessarily
beyond Secretary of Agriculture's statutory authority).
54. See Windham, 68 F.R.D. at 647 (holding that participation in antitrust violation was
necessarily outside scope of Secretary of Agriculture's statutory authority, but falling to
consider whether Secretary of Agriculture had statutory authority to make decisions relating
to South Carolina tobacco market).
55. See Rex Systems, Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d 994, 995-96 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that
in awarding contracts to manufacture APX-72's, government officers followed statutory
solicitation process). In Rex Systems Rex failed to allege any action or decision by Contracting
Officer Holiday or Secretary Lehman that exceeded the scope of their statutory authority. Id.;
see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing statutory solicitation process). Rex only
alleged that Holiday's and Lehman's decisions on how to proceed under the solicitation process
violated the antitrust laws. Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 996; see Larson, 337 U.S. at 698 (noting
that only actions that are unconstitutional or beyond federal officer's statutory authority are
actionable).
56. See Larson, 337 U.S at 695 (holding that court may not enjoin or direct actions of
sovereign); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting that 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304-2305
empowers military officers to make contracting decisions under solicitation process).
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Officer Holiday and Secretary
able to recover in suits against Contracting
7
Lehman in their individual capacities.1
In dismissing Rex's antitrust claims, however, the Fourth Circuit discussed neither Windham nor Larson 8 Although the Fourth Circuit in Rex
Systems primarily relied on Sea-Land, at least one commentator has suggested that the D.C. Circuit in Sea-Land too rigidly relied on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the term "person" under the Sherman Act.5 9 The
commentator has suggested that by narrowly interpreting the term "person"
under the Sherman Act, the Sea-Land court failed to consider circumstances
that have arisen since Congress enacted the antitrust laws and that arguably
would allow plaintiffs to sue entities of the United States for antitrust
violations! 0 One circumstance that might allow courts to hear antitrust suits
against governmental entities is that Congress recently amended the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)6 1to eliminate sovereign immunity in equitable
actions against the United States except in those actions in which the court
perceives an appropriate alternate ground for dismissing. 2 Although the
amendments to the APA provided courts with an opportunity to allow
antitrust suits against governmental entities, the D.C. Circuit in Sea-Land
chose to dismiss an equitable antitrust action against a governmental entity
63
on alternate grounds.
57. See Larson, 337 U.S. at 695 (noting that government official may be liable in
individual capacity for civil law violations).
58. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (discussing case law on which Fourth
Circuit based decision to dismiss Rex's claims).
59. See Comment, The Federal Government's Antitrust Immunity- Trade As I Say,
Not As I Do: Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Alaska Railroad, 56 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 515, 520-21
(1982) (suggesting that D.C. Circuit in Sea-Land incorrectly derived broad legal principle that
federal government never may be antitrust defendant). The commentator suggested that by
relying solely on the Supreme Court's interpretation in Cooper of the term "person," the
D.C. Circuit in Sea-Land overlooked the thorough analysis of the antitrust laws upon which
the Supreme Court based its holding in Cooper that the United States was not entitled to
bring suits under the Sherman Act. Id. at 525. The commentator concluded that the Supreme
Court in Cooper advocated extensive statutory construction, rather than a strict rule that the
United States never can be subject to the antitrust laws. Id.
60. See id. at 522-33 (discussing judicial precedent, legislative history, and public policy
that support bringing United States under antitrust laws); see also infra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text (discussing recent Congressional amendments to Administrative Procedure
Act).
61. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
62. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (allowing persons injured through action of government
agency to sue agency or responsible federal officer for relief other than money damages, unless
court chooses to deny relief on other legal or equitable ground); Comment, supra note 59, at
529 (suggesting amendments to Administrative Procedure Act eliminate sovereign immunity as
bar to antitrust suits against United States government).
63. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding
appropriate ground to dismiss antitrust action against federal entity notwithstanding Administrative Procedure Act amendments), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982). In Sea-Land the D.C.
Circuit expressly noted that sovereign immunity alone would not bar an equitable suit against
United States' agencies and officials. Id.
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By dismissing an equitable antitrust action in Sea-Land, the D.C. Circuit
refused to preempt extensive Congressional legislation in the field of antitrust
law by allowing the amended APA to become a means for bringing antitrust
suits against the United States and its entities. 64 The Sea-Land court appropriately recognized Congress' policy to enhance the ability of the United

States government to enforce the antitrust laws.65 Neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court, however, has suggested that the United States and its

entities also should be subject to antitrust suits. 6 The Fourth Circuit in Rex
Systems correctly agreed with the Sea-Land court that a clear statement

from Congress making the federal government subject to antitrust suits
should precede judicial recognition of antitrust actions against the United

States and its entities. 67 Both Rex Systems and Sea-Land, therefore, follow

a common judicial policy against altering a field of legislation that Congress
6
clearly and carefully has established. 1
Neither the Fourth Circuit in Rex Systems nor the D.C. Circuit in SeaLand, however, denied the existence of sound policy reasons that favor
69
extending antitrust liability to include the United States and its entities.

Both the expanding role of the federal government as a buyer and seller of
goods and the longstanding policy of the federal government to eliminate

anticompetitive activity from the nation's economy support the argument
for bringing the United States within the reach of the antitrust laws. 70 The

64. See id. at 245-47 (refusing to preempt Congressional legislation by allowing antitrust
suits against United States and its entities under Administrative Procedure Act amendments).
The Sea-Land court recognized that when Congress has desired fundamental changes, Congress
has amended the antitrust laws. Id. The court noted that in 1955 Congress amended the
Clayton Act expressly to allow the United States to bring antitrust suits for damages. See id.
at 247 (noting clear congressional intent to enable United States to sue under antitrust laws);
supra note 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing 1955 amendment to Clayton Act).
65. See Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 245 (suggesting that Congress, in amending Clayton Act,
intended to provide additional governmental weapon against antitrust violations); 101 CoNG.
Rac. 5131 (1955) (remarks of Rep. Rogers) (emphasizing that primary objective of 1955
amendments to antitrust laws was to enable United States to institute suits).
66. See Rex Systems, Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d 994, 997 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that
Supreme Court consistently has refused to allow antitrust suits against federal government);
Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 246 (refusing to create governmental antitrust liability that Congress
has declined to enact).
67. See Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 997 (declining to bring federal government within reach
of antitrust laws); Sea-Land 659 F.2d at 247 (refusing to preempt Congress from making
major changes in antitrust laws).
68. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1940) (declining to make
additions to antitrust laws that Congress could have made). See generally I SUtRLn D
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3.26 (4th ed. 1985) (noting modern tendency of courts to allow
legislatures to change and modernize existing law).
69. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(acknowledging but refusing to consider policy reasons favoring extension of antitrust liability
to include federal government), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982).
70. Comment, supra note 59, at 530-33 (suggesting that both purpose of Sherman Act
to eliminate all anti-competitive activity and role of United States as purchaser and seller of
goods favor allowing antitrust suits against United States and agencies). When Congress
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Fourth Circuit in Rex Systems, like the D.C. Circuit in Sea-Land, correctly
recognized, however, that in the heavily legislated field of antitrust law,
Congress, not the judiciary, should consider the arguments favoring extension of the antitrust laws and fashion any necessary changes. 7 1 The Fourth
Circuit, therefore, properly refused to alter dramatically the federal antitrust
73
laws.7 2 The Fourth Circuit, thus, clearly followed Sea-Land and its progeny.
In Rex Systems the Fourth Circuit held that a military contractor could
not bring an antitrust action against the United States Navy, the Secretary
of the Navy acting in an official capacity, or the Navy's Contracting Officer
acting in an official capacity. 74 Relying primarily on the D.C. Circuit's
reasoning in Sea-Land, the Fourth Circuit held that the United States and
75
entities of the United States are not persons subject to antitrust suits.
Several recent circuit court opinions similarly have disposed of antitrust
suits against governmental entities.7 6 Like the other circuits, the Fourth
Circuit correctly decided to allow Congress to effect fundamental changes
77
in the antitrust laws.
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amended the antitrust laws in 1955, Congress recognized the active role of the United States
as a purchaser of goods and services. See 101 CONG. REc. 5130 (1955) (remarks of Rep.
Keating) (recognizing United States as nation's largest purchaser of goods and services).
Congress chose, nevertheless, to alter only the federal government's status as an antitrust
plaintiff while refusing to impose antitrust liability. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (authorizing
United States to sue alleged violators of antitrust laws).
71. See Rex Systems, Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d 994, 997 (4th Cir. 1987) (refusing to
ignore judicial precedent that rejects antitrust suits against United States entities and officials);
Sea-Land, 659 F.2d at 247 (awaiting congressional approval of antitrust suits against entities
of United States).
72. See Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 997 (declining to subject entities of United States to
antitrust liability).
73. See id. (following prior judicial interpretations of Sherman Act); supra note 26 and
accompanying text (citing other circuit court opinions on whether agencies or instrumentalities
of United States are amenable to suit under antitrust laws).
74. See Rex Systems, 814 F.2d at 997 (dismissing plaintiff's antitrust suits against all
federal defendants); supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
dismissal of antitrust suit against all federal defendants).
75. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's agreement
in Rex Systems with reasoning of D.C. Circuit in Sea-Land).
76. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing cases that support proposition
that United States and entities are not persons within meaning of Sherman Act).
77. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing argument for awaiting
congressional legislation that allows antitrust suits against United States).

